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Abstract
If physics is a science that unveils the fundamental laws of nature, then
the appearance of mathematical formulae in its language can be surpris-
ing or even mysterious. This was Eugene Wigner’s argument in 1960.
I show that another approach to physical theory accommodates mathe-
matics in a perfectly reasonable way. To explore unknown processes or
phenomena, one builds a theory by employing fundamental principles as
constraints within a general mathematical framework. Such studies of
the unknown, or blackbox models, demonstrate the unsurprising effec-
tiveness of mathematics on the example of Einstein’s principle theories,
the S-matrix approach in quantum field theory, effective field theories,
and device-independent approaches in quantum information.
1 Introduction
“The enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is some-
thing bordering on the mysterious. . . [T]here is no rational explanation for
it,” wrote Eugene Wigner in a well-known article in 1960 [51]. Above all,
this “unreasonable” effectiveness manifests itself in physics. The latter,
for Wigner, is devoted to “discovering the laws of inanimate nature.” This
view of physics, widespread but also challenged several times during the
20th century, relies on the concept of “law of nature” in a fundamental
way. Any such law applies to one or several kinds of inanimate matter and
describes their dynamical evolution. Physics is seen, then, as a study of
natural phenomena by first deducing and subsequently applying the corre-
sponding general laws. It may indeed seem mysterious that mathematical
formulae should provide a faithful expression of such laws.
I submit that the effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences is
perfectly reasonable and rational if one adopts a different view of physical
theory. This view applies whenever the object of study involves phenom-
ena or processes whose nature remains unknown. In these circumstances,
physicists are not in position to say what kind of matter is involved but
they are nevertheless eager to build a theory. For this, they employ fun-
damental principles, which are tasked with limiting the possibilities in
theoretical description of unknown facts. For short, this approach will be
named ‘blackbox models.’ The main property of the blackbox approach
is that physical theory built in accordance with it is to be constrained by
universal principles rather than dynamical laws. On this point it stands
in opposition to Wigner’s view but at the same time it remains sufficiently
widespread, with applications spanning more than a century of research
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work that gave birth to new physical theories and discoveries. I illustrate
the importance of this physics of the unknown on four examples: Ein-
stein’s principle theories (Section 2), S-matrix (Section 3), effective field
theories (Section 4), and device-independent approaches (Section 5). On
the basis of the case studies I will argue that the effectiveness of math-
ematics in blackbox models is neither surprising nor unreasonable. In
fact, their success depends on mathematics as a driving force of theoretic
construction.
2 Principle theories
In 1919 Einstein made a well-known distinction between principle and
constructive theories [19]. Constructive theories match Wigner’s view of
physics: they contain dynamical laws describing the behaviour of particu-
lar kinds of matter, like Newton’s laws do for the movement of rigid bodies.
By contrast, a principle theory, e.g., Einstein’s own special relativity, is a
theory derived from simple postulates. It does not begin with an assump-
tion about the type of matter or its dynamics; these become consequences
of the postulates rather than theoretical prerequisites. The postulates
are formulated as universal physical principles and are expressed in the
formalism as mathematical axioms.
For example, the relativity principle or the upper limit on velocities
given by the speed of light play the role of fundamental principles in
Einstein’s relativity theory. A modern avatar of these postulates, called
no-signalling, stipulates that in an experimental setting with two observers
the choice of measurement by one party must not influence the statistics of
the outcomes registered by a different party. It is widely used in device-
independent approaches for introducing constraints on operations with
quantum information (see Section 5). The interest of this formulation is
that it is entirely non-dynamical: no-signalling is an algebraic condition
expressed in the language of conditional probability. At best it receives a
kinematic — but not a dynamical — expression.
To use Einstein’s own words about principle theories, the principles
are employed in them in order to “narrow the possibilities” [17]. This
means that one should begin the model-building exercise by adopting a
very inclusive framework that can encompass the unknown phenomena
in question but also much more. This framework may possibly extend
beyond what has been or can be experimentally observed at the current
stage of technological development. The point of starting with such a
broad framework is to accommodate a yet unspecified theory with unpre-
dictable empirical consequences. Principles, then, limit the possibilities
offered by the broadness of the framework and serve to narrow it down
to a particular model. For example, no-signalling excludes faster-than-
light travel in a geometric framework with a preselected spacetime, either
Euclidean or Minkowski, or in the Riemannian way of introducing a space-
time manifold. In a non-dynamical framework which does not begin with a
geometric object, the very notion of ‘travel’ might be undefined. Here, the
no-signalling principle helps to make sure that a purely algebraic model
will not produce a contradiction with the theory of relativity when it is
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applied for the description of real-world phenomena. The impossibility of
faster-than-light signalling is “elevated” [23, p. 88] to the status of uni-
versal postulate even in the absence of geometric assumptions. It then
becomes a fundamental principle of nature and a constitutive feature of
physical theories.
Einstein’s own road to the distinction between principle and construc-
tive theories was a challenging one. After his 1905 article describing the
photoelectric effect in terms of light quanta [18], his belief in the funda-
mental character and the exact validity of Maxwell’s electrodynamics was
destabilized. As he wrote in the 1949 Autobiographical Notes,
Reflections of this type [on the dual wave-particle nature of
radiation] made it clear to me as long ago as shortly after
1900, i.e., shortly after Planck’s trailblazing work, that neither
mechanics nor electrodynamics could (except in limiting cases)
claim exact validity. By and by I despaired of the possibility
of discovering the true laws by means of constructive efforts
based on known facts. [20, p. 51, 53]
This “desperation” led Einstein to special relativity. To find the theory,
it was necessary to look for one that would not be based on “known
facts.” Special relativity, indeed, remains mute on the issue of material
constitution of the rods and clocks that act as its measurement devices.
There is good evidence that Einstein believed that this lack of con-
structivity was a disadvantage and that principle theories did not offer a
satisfactory understanding of physics [11, 24]. This claim has been chal-
lenged recently via a comparison with James Jeans’s position [32] but
another, more seasoned critique focuses on the status of general relativ-
ity. According to Brown, it should be seen as a constructive theory since
it contains a dynamical law [10]. Without entering the debate on rela-
tivity, I would like to emphasize the importance of the argument from
explanatory power. The capacity to explain phenomena was uncontro-
versially ascribed by Einstein only to constructive theories: “When we
say we have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we
invariably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers
the processes in question“ [19]. Einstein wished to build an explanatory
account based on known facts but despaired to do so. In his time and
later, the desideratum to obtain a constructive theory as a replacement
of principle-based special relativity never came to be realized.
To be sure, constructive theories are still widely in use. What has
changed since the time of Einstein’s tergiversations is that principles
theories are now taken to be explanatory as well as capable of giving
an understanding of physics on a par with constructive theories. The
principle-based approach has been recognized as a legitimate way of do-
ing physics. Its key method: the choice of a broad framework and its
subsequent narrowing down through limiting principles, is at the same
time an application of mathematics to physics and the enabling force be-
hind theory-building and physical explanation. A conjunction of these
two factors showcases the first examples of physical theory in which it is
perfectly reasonable to assign a central methodological and explanatory
place to mathematics.
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3 S-matrix
In the years before quantum electrodynamics and subsequently quantum
chromodynamics were fully developed it had not been clear that a field-
theoretic approach would be successful in accounting for the electromag-
netic, the weak and the strong interactions. In the early 1950s, for exam-
ple, it was not obvious to the physics community whether the method of
quantum field theory (QFT) based on gauge symmetry would be an appro-
priate framework for building the theory of strong interactions. A similar
uncertainty plagued quantum electrodynamics a decade earlier. In 1954,
same year as the work by Yang and Mills, during a conference discussion
in the presence of Oppenheimer, Gell-Mann, Fermi, Wick, and Dyson,
Goldberger challenged the applicability of QFT methods to nuclear inter-
actions. Surprisingly, nobody in the audience spoke to the contrary [35].
This episode was still remembered in the 1970s as a typical example of
early doubts about the future of quantum field theory [2].
The doubts about the applicability of QFT were prevalent because of
renormalizability issues. In response physicists began to look for methods
to build a theory that did not assume any known particle content lead-
ing to divergencies. The main idea of this approach was borrowed from
Heisenberg’s philosophical program in the 1920s, which prescribed that
a theory should focus only on observable quantities. This idea proved
to be extremely successful in the discovery of quantum mechanics [28].
The hope was that the same approach would again produce a crucial
insight. As Weinberg wrote, the physicists of the generation before his
own believed that “by using principles of unitarity, analyticity, Lorentz
invariance and other symmetries, it would be possible to calculate the
S-matrix, and you would never have to think about a quantum field” [48,
p. 248]. Indeed, history has largely followed this prescription in develop-
ing the way in which our current physical theories with unknown particle
content are constructed. One detail of this approach presents a particu-
lar philosophical interest. For a theoretician, the central question bears
on the mathematical content of the theory: what mathematical objects
should one use? Furthermore, what physical constraints can one impose
on such objects? The success of the theory directly depends on finding an
appropriate mathematical framework and tools.
In 1937 John Wheeler introduced one such mathematical object, which
he called the scattering matrix, later to be known as S-matrix [50]. Whe-
eler’s initial intent was to develop a mathematical method of “resonating
group structure” that would allow one to build a description of the whole
interacting system of elementary particles from the knowledge of its parts.
This did not fully work out. Wheeler, however, obtained a result suggest-
ing that the problem as he had formulated it could in fact be bypassed:
“The connection which we have obtained between the scattering and dis-
integration cross sections does not depend for its validity on the accuracy
of what we have called the method of resonating group structure.” The
scattering matrix that involved the cross sections depended only on some
general asymptotic properties but not on the details of the interacting
compound system. Among the general arguments used by Wheeler one
mainly finds symmetry considerations credited by him to Bohr and Jor-
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dan. In the wake of Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics, Wheeler’s work
provided a new example of a physical theory of unknown interactions,
which involved exclusively the observables. It was built through the in-
troduction of a new mathematical object. Wheeler published the results
but did not pursue his method further; only much later did his scattering
matrix become known as a precursor of the S-matrix theory of strong
interactions [34, p. 990].
Between 1942 and 1944 Heisenberg, who did not know about Wheeler’s
work, wrote a series of three articles in Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik explicitly
pursuing the goal of building a theory of unknown physics. The reason
why the constructive physical content had to be taken as unknown, ac-
cording to Heisenberg, was that the theory could change in the future:
In view of the later alteration [Aba¨nderung] of the theory, the
present investigation attempts to isolate from the conceptual
scheme of the quantum theory of wave fields those concepts
which probably will not be affected by the future changes [in
the theory of elementary particles] and which may therefore
represent and integral part [Bestandteil] also of the future the-
ory. [30]
The concepts that Heisenberg thought not be affected by a future the-
ory change were the observable quantities. He admitted although, in an
indisputable influence of his earlier discussions with Einstein, that ‘only
the final theory will decide which quantities are “really observable.”’ As
early as 1938, simultaneously with Wheeler but independently, Heisenberg
wrote:
Perhaps one may remember to advantage, in attempting to
find new concepts, that in mathematical formulae, we are now
confronted with the tast of finding computational rules, by
which we can connect the cross sections. . . [29]
This stance, to quote the historian Helmut Rechenberg, was a consequence
of the fact that “one did not yet know how to formulate a divergence-free
theory describing elementary particles” [42]. Heisenberg’s conviction was
that the right theory would contain a minimal length. It was not im-
mediately clear, however, how one was supposed to introduce such mini-
mal length in QFT. Heisenberg reasonably believed that the asymptotic
results, because they belong among observable quantities that the the-
ory must be able to predict, should remain independent of the minimal
length. While working out a complete theory remained a matter for fu-
ture research, it was possible to introduce a direct connection between the
momenta and the energies of free particles and the scattering and reaction
cross sections. The connection was to be expressed mathematically: “It
seemed appropriate to find a mathematical [our emphasis - AG] object
capable of housing these observable quantities. Heisenberg realized that
the momentum space kernel of the probability amplitude for transitions
between free particle states was the object he wanted” [27]. Thus Heisen-
berg introduced a unitary ‘characteristic’ S-matrix becoming the founding
father the the S-matrix approach in theoretical physics.
Heisenberg’s S-matrix met fierce opposition from Wolfgang Pauli. He
believed that it could not be fundamental, because the way the approach
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was constructed did not rely on arguments from simplicity and, in fact,
produced a result that was anything but simple:
In general I have arrived at the opinion that the S-matrix is not
a concept, of which we may expect that it occurs in a future
theory as a primary fundamental concept. It indeed has the
character of something complicated and derived and therefore
might hardly be suitable to lead us beyond the present wave
mechanics. [36]
This lack of simplicity underwrote Pauli’s conviction that the S-matrix
could not be a part of the laws of nature. It seems that Pauli believed for
the general reasons of mathematical elegance that a law of nature should
have a simple expression. He then concluded:
The S-matrix, although it might exist in a future theory, seems
to be completely unfit to constitute the point of departure for
a [new] theory. It is not the quantity which will occur in the
general laws of nature, but a late consequence of them. [37]
This reveals the tension between two approaches to physical theory, each
pushing toward a different role of the mathematical formalism. Pauli
wished to have a theory containing laws of nature, i.e., dynamical rules of
evolution of particular kinds of matter. If a law is found, e.g., describing
light quanta, and if this law has a mathematical expression, then it is
perfectly legitimate to wonder why mathematics would be so effective in
describing the behaviour of light quanta. It is even more surprising that
mathematics is equally effective in describing the evolution of directly
perceivable objects like tables or chairs. Whatever answer one may give
to this Wignerian wonder, the theory in question is a constructive theory
in Einstein’s terms.
The situation is different with principle theories. They explore un-
known territories, which cannot yet be accounted for in terms of a par-
ticular kind of matter, let alone a law of its dynamical evolution. The
S-matrix, as Wheeler discovered, bypasses the problem of “resonating
group structure,” which would describe the content of the theory in terms
of interacting particles. Similarly, Heisenberg’s focus on observable quan-
tities does not require a physical description of how one such observable
gets dynamically converted into another. The middle ground can remain
unknown—a black box—while mathematical relations will still be avail-
able describing the relation between the observables. This is a clear sign
that mathematics in a principle theory is not playing the role of underwrit-
ing the laws of nature, as Wigner thought, but rather of letting a theory
of the unknown to be built in the first place. When Gregor Wentzel called
the S-matrix program “very incomplete—it is like an empty frame for a
picture yet to be painted” [49], he believed to be giving a pejorative as-
sessment of Heisenberg’s program. In fact, he put his finger on the main
feature of principle theories: a physical theory is possible without filling
in “an empty frame” or opening up a black box.
The S-matrix theory of nuclear interactions has become history after
the advent of quantum chromodynamics but the S-matrix approach is still
well and alive. In quantum gravity, for example, it is used for constructing
6
low-energy models of supergravity from high-energy theories like string
theory. String theory itself was discovered by Veneziano as a consequence
of his work on the S-matrix approach, when he used general principles
to correctly guess the unknown amplitudes satisfying duality properties,
which described the excitations of a one-dimensional object [44]. One can
use this all-encompassing theory of quantum gravity to construct low-
energy gravitational models with unknown physical content. This study
of unknown territory requires the same tool as the one used by Heisenberg
for exploring the unknown land of QFT, the S-matrix:
Such an S-matrix, which is tightly constrained by properties
such as unitarity and analyticity, can be a very powerful way to
summarize our ignorance of a theory. . . . We might anticipate
that such study in the context of gravity, supplemented by
additional physical input, could bear important fruit. [25]
Thus the anticipated physics is always mathematical.
4 Effective field theories
The S-matrix approach only asked ‘practical’ questions about the yet un-
known theory of strong interactions, formulated in the language of physical
observables, and methodically avoided the need to have a full theory. In
the effective field theory (EFT) approach the unknown is not the theory
of nuclear interactions but new physics beyond the Standard Model. With
little prospect for distinguishing in the near future between the different
alternatives for this new physics, EFT offers a method for developing a
theory-independent approach, where all that matters about the new un-
known physics are its observable effects. Just as S-matrix allows one
to focus on observable quantities and disregard the quantum field, EFT
relieves one from the need to worry about physical content of the high-
energy theory. Indeed, EFT prescribes that the Lagrangian include all
terms in the most general form compatible with symmetry principles. No
particular physical content or physical meaning is assumed, while symme-
try principles are employed as constraints.
The notion of renormalizability in the context of quantum field the-
ory and its early representatives like quantum electrodynamics (QED)
was developed in the mid-20th century by Bethe, Schwinger, Tomonaga,
Feynman, and Dyson. The latter introduced crucial power-counting tech-
niques for analyzing operator relevance. Since his 1949 work [15, 16] and
up to 1970s renormalizability had been thought of as a necessary condition
for a quantum field theory to make sense. Wilson’s work on the renor-
malization group [52] has paved the way to a change of attitude toward
renormalizability. This was mainly due to a change of attitude toward the
reality of the renormalization cut-off. In the older understanding, the cut-
off scale was a residue of abstract mathematics introduced with the only
goal of avoiding infinities in summation series. The new appreciation of
non-renormalizable theories came with the understanding that the cut-off
could be taken as physical and corresponding to the limit of applicability
of a given theory. New physics was to be expected beyond the cut-off scale
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ΛNP . Thus the domain of applicability of particular QFTs has become
clearly limited by a number denoting an energy scale. Quantum field the-
ories began to be seen as effective field theories valid up to some frontier,
rather than fundamental theories of nature. Wilson’s work and Wein-
berg’s reintroduction of EFTs as useful theories with ‘phenomenological
Lagrangians’ [45, 47, 46] boosted this new view on EFTs.
Much of the historic development of EFTs focused on the top-down
approach, which stipulates that the fundamental physical theory is known
but is inapplicable for practical purposes. This inapplicability may be due
to the complexity of high-energy theory or, as in the case of EFT in con-
densed matter physics, to heuristic arguments: “Even when one knows the
theory at a microscopic level (i.e., the fundamental theory), there is often a
good reason to deliberately move away to an effective theory” [43]. A typ-
ical example from particle physics is the chiral perturbation theory, which
gives a low-energy approximation of quantum chromodynamics (QCD) in
the light quark sector (for a review see [38]). Even when physical content
is known, then, it is often instructive and necessary to build a physical
theory as if this content remained unknown. This underlines the impor-
tance of blackbox models: the history of the top-down approach, treating
the known as if it were unknown, goes back to the Euler-Heisenberg cal-
culation in the 1930s of photon-photon scattering at small energies within
the framework of Dirac’s quantum field theory [22, 21, 31].
High-energy physics today uses an alternative EFT approach, some-
times called ‘bottom-up’. Its popularity reflects a change in the way in
which EFTs are now conceived. Today physicists tend to think of all
physical theories, including the Standard Model, as EFTs with respect to
new physics at higher energies. Blackbox models have become universal:
any quantum field theory is, to some extent, a theory of the unknown.
A typical model-building scenario, following Wilson, starts with a La-
grangian of an effective field theory (EFT) valid up to scale Λ. This
Lagrangian can be generally written as a sum over local operator prod-
ucts:
L =
∞∑
n=0
λn
Λn
On. (1)
Coefficients λn are coupling constants. They encode information on the
physics at scales higher than Λ and can be fixed experimentally or through
a calculation by the renormalization group if the underlying high-energy
theory is known. The only constraints on the form of operator product
terms On come from the symmetries of the theory. The tree level of the
power series in 1
Λ
is obtained by the usual Standard Model calculation.
Effects of new physics appear in loop corrections and influence the value
of coupling constants λn. The main value of Lagrangian (1) for high-
energy physics is that it can be used to study low-energy effects of new
physics beyond the Standard Model without having to specify what this
new physics actually is.
For example, consider a ‘top-down’ electroweak EFT that reproduces
the Standard Model for the light degrees of freedom (light quarks, leptons
and gauge bosons) as long as energies involved are small compared with
the Higgs mass [38]. This EFT is Higgless in the sense that it cuts off the
8
Higgs sector by a choice of Λ. The lowest order effective Lagrangian fixes
the masses of Z and W bosons at tree level and does not carry information
on the underlying symmetry breaking SU(2)L × U(1)Y → U(1)QED. At
the next order the most general effective chiral Lagrangian with only gauge
bosons and Goldstone fields,
L(4)EW =
14∑
i=0
aiOi, (2)
contains 15 independent operators. This complexity is essential as it stems
from the requirement that we use the most general form of the Lagrangian
compatible with symmetry principles. Gell-Mann has even formulated this
rule as a “totalitarian principle” which states that everything which is not
forbidden is compulsory [9]. For Lagrangian (2), constraints from sym-
metry include invariance with respect to CP and SU(2)L ×U(1)Y . Also,
three of the fifteen operators vanish as a consequence of the equations
of motion under the assumption of light fermions. With the remaining
terms, one finds various effects such as the usual electroweak oblique cor-
rections (6 operators involved at the bilinear, 4 at the trilinear and 5 at
the quartic levels), corrections to rare B and K decays, the CP -violating
parameter, etc. Thus, the approximation of a very large Higgs mass in
the Standard Model gives an EFT which possesses phenomenological pre-
dictive power, providing an easier way to perform calculations than the
complete Standard Model Lagrangian.
As if he were developing an argument to counter Pauli’s critique of
Heisenberg’s S-matrix, Weinberg insists that the absence of any assump-
tion of simplicity about the EFT Lagrangian is what makes the EFT
method so efficient [48, p. 246]. He further supports the parallel by claim-
ing that “the S-matrix philosophy is not far from the modern philosophy
of effective field theories”. However, he also adds a critique of S-matrix:
“More important than any philosophical hang-ups was the fact that quan-
tum field theory didn’t seem to be going anywhere in accounting for the
strong and weak interactions”. The S-matrix was the only rational reac-
tion to a situation in which no one knew what language to use, nor in which
direction to look for a theory of the strong and weak interactions. This
was a despair quite analogous to Einstein’s unease when he had realized
that the theory he was developing could not be based on known facts (Sec-
tion 2). Similarly, today we do not know whether supersymmetry, or extra
dimensions, or yet another model, will turn out to be the right solution
for new physics. However, the blackbox approach to unknown phenomena
has been generalized in EFT to the point where we apply it above and
beyond any situation of despair. It has become a usual, and arguably a
normative, tool in quantum field theory. Like Einstein or Heisenberg, we
resort to a language that does not require knowledge of the dynamical
laws or constitutive types of matter. Unlike Einstein or Heisenberg, we
treat this situation as perfectly reasonable. The method of building an
EFT that starts from a general mathematical framework of gauge theory,
then proceeds with a Lagrangian compatible with the constraints coming
from symmetry principles, is neither a surprising nor a scandalous jump
as Pauli may have thought about Heinsenberg’s S-matrix. That mathe-
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matics plays an effective role in physics of the unknown, seen from the
point of view of effective field theories, is a new normal.
5 Device-independent models
Quantum cryptography works with systems of “unspecified character” [4]
or “unknown nature” [5]. This is performed in a device-independent ap-
proach: a theoretical investigation that does not rely on the knowledge of
laws governing the systems’ behaviour. A conventional ‘device’ refers
here to any process or apparatus described by an operational theory,
whether classical or quantum, which is explicitly designated. This ter-
minology was first introduced by Mayers and Yao [33], who developed
device-independent quantum cryptography with imperfect sources. Over
the years quantum cryptography has developed an array of such meth-
ods for dealing with adversaries which, via action upon sources, effec-
tively turn systems into untrusted entities. Device-independent protocols
are important for randomness generation [14, 39], quantum key distribu-
tion [6], estimation of the states of unknown systems [5], certification of
multipartite entanglement [4], and distrustful cryptography [1]. Some of
these cryptographic protocols have found a broader use in quantum infor-
mation, e.g., device-independent tests performed on Bell inequalities or
on the assumption that superluminal signaling is impossible [3].
In full generality, device-independent models are defined as a set of n
parties, each of which ‘selects’ a measurement setting or ‘places’ an input
value x1 ∈ X1, . . . , xn ∈ Xn respectively, and ‘subsequently’ ‘obtains’ an
output value or a measurement result a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An. The sets
X1, . . . ,Xn and A1, . . . ,An are alphabets of finite cardinality. The verbs
used in these expressions merely convey an operational meaning of the in-
puts and outputs; they do not imply that any party exercises free will or
has conscious decision-making procedures. The term ‘subsequently’ intro-
duces a local time arrow pointing from each party’s input to its output.
Although such local time arrows seem quite intuitive, in full generality
they need not be assumed either. A fully general setting requires, there-
fore, that absolutely nothing be postulated about the way inputs are trans-
formed into outputs, except two conditions: a) these two types of data are
clearly distinguished; b) the process of transformation is physical. Physics
is contained in the probability distribution p = P (a1, . . . , an|x1, . . . , xn)
(Figure 1).
All device-independent models studied in the literature introduce fur-
ther constraints on p. The most frequent one is the no-signalling principle
discussed in Section 2: a choice of measurement by one party must not
influence the statistics of the outcomes registered by a different party.
Mathematically, the distribution p is non-signalling if and only if all one-
party marginal probabilities are functions of their respective inputs xi:
P (ai|x1, . . . , xn) = P (ai|xi). (3)
Although very common, this assumption is not universal: when device-
independent methods are used to test general causal inequalities, the im-
possibility of signalling is not a prerequisite [7].
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Figure 1: In the case of n = 3 parties, physics is fully contained in the proba-
bilities p = P (a1a2a3|x1x2x3).
One of the earliest examples of device-independent methods in quan-
tum information involves what is literally called a box. The no-signalling
constraint was studied by Popescu and Rohrlich [41] through the intro-
duction of a non-local, or Popescu-Rohrlich (PR), box describing un-
known processes which connect the inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1} and the outputs
a, b ∈ {0, 1} of two parties according to the joint distribution:
P (ab|xy) =
{
1/2 : a+ b = xy mod 2
0 : otherwise.
(4)
While a PR-box is a general algebraic framework designed to go beyond
quantum theory, the application of the no-signalling principle implies that
this box nevertheless respects the laws of special relativity. Its device-
independent non-local structure accommodates a violation of the Tsirelson
bound [12] by reaching the maximum amount of correlations in the CHSH
inequality [8, 13].
Hailed as a “very important recent development” [40], device-indepen-
dent models are characterized by the absence of assumptions about the
internal workings of the box. Its ‘interior’ is not described by a particular
physical theory. The box is unknown territory which, since it is assumed
to be of interest for physical theory, is also a territory of science. The
entire setup belongs within the boundaries of physics; at the same time,
it opens a possibility to redefine these very boundaries [26]. This redef-
inition is achieved via the use of mathematics: particular mathematical
constraints are applied in the general operational probabilistic framework,
whose only elementary notions are the inputs and the outputs. Not only is
the effectiveness of mathematics unsurprising; it becomes a driving force
propelling the development of physical theory.
6 Conclusion
Wigner’s point about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in
physical theory was that nothing, in principle, urges nature to be math-
ematical. Wigner did not seek to ground his statement in a particular
philosophical system but rather expressed the immediate surprise of any-
one who discovers that mathematical formulae can correctly describe the
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objective world or reality outside human mind. Evidently, a Pythagorean
or a neo-Platonist would not be so surprised, for these philosophical sys-
tems put the number among the fundamental constitutive principles of
nature. But Wigner’s amazement remain valid nevertheless.
In theoretical terms the Wignerian wonder can be understood as a
question about what we observe or manipulate in the outside world: why
are these objective phenomena and inert matter described by mathemat-
ical laws? But physical theory does not always deal with phenomena or
matter that are already known or available. Often it must explore the un-
known. In this case, one of the tasks of physical theory is to determine the
kind of matter involved or the type of phenomena that can be observed
in support of new theory. The impulse for creating such a theory comes
from the urge to study a new and unknown territory. The origin of the
urge usually lies in the dissatisfaction with old theories rather than any
precise ideas about where to look for a new one. On other occasions old
and complete theories are too complex or unsuited for the needs of solving
particular problems. It is then reasonable to treat what is known as if it
were unknown. Physics of the unknown establishes itself as an exploratory
instrument also within the territory of known facts and phenomena.
Physical theory of the unknown is a blackbox model trying to find
a link between the inputs and the outputs of the box. This is the lan-
guage of the device-independent approach. Equivalently, one may say
with Heisenberg that it only operates with observable quantities. Wheeler
expressed the same idea by focusing his introduction of the S-matrix on
asymptotically free particle states. In effective field theories, the unknown
high-energy theory is replaced by operators describing all possible effects
observable at a given energy scale.
What is unknown is placed in a black box, which the theory does not
necessarily seek to open up. As Einstein’s principle theory show, this ap-
proach does not and often cannot help to uncover the content of the box.
In spite of its non-constructive character, it can still be predictive and
explanatory. Explanation in this case comes, not from the knowledge of
what is inside the box, but from the postulates that constrain the con-
nection between the inputs and the outputs. If a theory is successful and
makes correct predictions, then these principles become our best candi-
dates for fundamental principles of nature. This new knowledge about the
world does not come in the form of a new dynamical law for a new kind
of matter. Instead we learn a new principle, whose status is established
through an enquiry grounded in mathematics.
The connection between the inputs and the outputs of a black box in
a device-independent approach is inherently mathematical. To develop
a principle theory means to identify the right mathematical link, hence
a right mathematical concept and often a right mathematical language
for connecting the inputs and the outputs. This search is performed in
the space of theories rather than in an empirical world of physical exper-
imentation. A success, for sure, can only be proclaimed if the identified
mathematical object helps to make empirical predictions or explain phe-
nomena that had previously stayed unaccounted. Whenever one achieves
such success, the mathematical nature of this connection between the
inputs and the outputs also provides constitutive power for the theory.
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Contrary to Wigner’s attitude of mystery and amazement, the effective-
ness of mathematics in describing the physics of the unknown—new and
uncharted territory of science or nature yet unexplored—cannot but be
deemed reasonable and unsurprising.
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